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ABSTRACT
It is by now well-known that small adversarial perturbations can induce classifi-
cation errors in deep neural networks (DNNs). In this paper, we make the case
that sparse representations of the input data are a crucial tool for combating such
attacks. For linear classifiers, we show that a sparsifying front end is provably
effective against `∞-bounded attacks, reducing output distortion due to the attack
by a factor of roughly K/N where N is the data dimension and K is the sparsity
level. We then extend this concept to DNNs, showing that a “locally linear” model
can be used to develop a theoretical foundation for crafting attacks and defenses.
Experimental results for the MNIST dataset show the efficacy of the proposed
sparsifying front end.
1 INTRODUCTION
It has been less than five years since Szegedy et al. (2014) and Goodfellow et al. (2015) pointed out
the vulnerability of deep networks to tiny, carefully designed adversarial perturbations, but there is
now widespread recognition that understanding and combating such attacks is a crucial challenge in
machine learning security. It was conjectured by Goodfellow et al. (2015) (see also later work by
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016); Poole et al. (2016); Fawzi et al. (2017)) that the vulnerability arises
not because deep networks are complicated and nonlinear, but because they are “too linear.” We argue
here that this intuition is spot on, using it to develop a systematic, theoretically grounded, framework
for design of both attacks and defenses, and making the case that sparse input representations are a
critical tool for defending against `∞-bounded perturbations.
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Figure 1: Defense against adversarial attacks via a sparsifying front end
Figure 1 depicts a classifier attacked by an adversary which can corrupt the input x by adding a
perturbation e satisfying ‖e‖∞ ≤ , and a defense based on a sparsifying front end, which exploits
the rather general observation that input data must be sparse in some basis in order to avoid the curse
of dimensionality. Specifically, we assume that input data x ∈ RN has a K-sparse representation
(K  N ) in an orthonormal basis Ψ: ∥∥ΨTx∥∥
0
≤ K. The front end enforces sparsity in domain Ψ
via functionHK(·), retaining the K coefficients largest in magnitude and zeroing out the rest.
The intuition behind why sparsity can help is quite clear: small perturbations can add up to a large
output distortion when the input dimension is large, and by projecting to a smaller subspace, we limit
the damage. Indeed, many recently proposed defenses implicitly use some notion of sparsity, such as
∗Joint first authors.
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JPEG compression (Das et al., 2017; Guo et al., 2018), PCA (Bhagoji et al., 2017), and projection
onto GAN-based generative models (Ilyas et al., 2017; Samangouei et al., 2018). Our goal here is to
provide a theoretically grounded framework which permits a systematic pursuit of sparsity as a key
tool, perhaps the key tool, for robust machine learning.
We first motivate our approach by rigorous results for linear classifiers, and then show how the
approach extends to general neural networks via a “locally linear” model.
2 LINEAR CLASSIFIERS
For a linear classifier, y(x) = wTx and hence the distortion caused by the adversary is
∆ =
∣∣wT xˆ−wTx∣∣. Denote the support of the K-sparse representation of x by SK(x) =
supp
(HK(ΨTx)). We say that we are in a high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime when the
support does not change due to the perturbation: SK(x) = SK(x+ e). The high SNR regime can be
characterized as follows:
Proposition 1. For sparsity level K, a sufficient condition for high SNR is: λ/ > 2M, where λ is
the magnitude of the smallest non-zero entry ofHK(ΨTx), and M = maxj ‖ψj‖1.1
We note that the high SNR condition is easier to satisfy for bases with sparser, or more localized,
basis functions (smaller M ).
The distortion now becomes ∆ =
∣∣eT PK(w,x)∣∣, where PK(w,x) = ∑k∈SK(x)ψkψTkw is the
projection of w onto the K-dimensional subspace spanned by SK(x). We now consider two settings:
• Semi-white box: Here the perturbations are designed based on knowledge of w alone, so that
eSW =  sgn(w) and ∆SW = 
∣∣sgn(wT )PK(w,x)∣∣. We note that the attack is aligned with w.
• White box: Here the adversary has knowledge of both w and the front end. Assuming high SNR,
the optimal perturbation is eW =  sgn(PK(w,x)), which yields ∆W =  ‖PK(w,x)‖1. Thus,
instead of aligning with w, eW is aligned to the projection of w on the subspace that x lies in.
In order to understand how well the sparsifying front end works, we take an ensemble average
over randomly chosen classifiers w, and show (Marzi et al., 2018) that, relative to no defense, the
attenuation in output distortion provided by the sparsifying front end is a factor of K/N for a semi-
white box attack, and is at least O(K polylog(N)/N) for the white box attack. We do not state these
theorems formally here due to lack of space. A practical take-away from the calculations involved is
that, in order for the defense to be effective against a white box attack, not only do we need K  N ,
but we also need that the individual basis functions be localized (small in `1 norm).
3 NEURAL NETWORKS
We skip a lot of details, but the key idea is to extend the intuition from linear classifiers to general
neural networks using the concept of a “locally linear” representation. The change in slope in a
ReLU function, or the selection of the maximum in a max pooling function, can be modeled as an
input-dependent switch. If we fix these switches, the transfer function from the input to the network
to, say, the inputs to an output softmax layer, is linear. Specifically, consider a multilayer (deep)
network with L classes. Using the locally linear model, each of the outputs of the network (prior to
softmax) can be written as
yi = w
{i}
eq
T
x− b{i}eq , i = 1, . . . , L,
where y = [y1, y2, ..., yL]T . The softmax layer computes pi = Si(y) = eyi/
(∑L
j=1 e
yj
)
.
Applying the theory developed for linear classifiers to w{i}eq , we see that a sparsifying front end will
attenuate the distortion going in to the softmax layer. And of course, the adversary can use the locally
linear model to devise attacks analogous with those for linear classifiers, as follows.
Semi-white box and white box attacks: Assume that x belongs to class t, with label t known to the
adversary (a pessimistic but realistic assumption, given that the attacker can run the input through
a high-accuracy network prior to devising its attack). The adversary can sidestep the nonlinearity
1Here ψj denotes the jth column of Ψ, i.e. Ψ = [ψ1,ψ2, . . . ,ψN ].
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Table 1: Classification accuracies (in %) for 3 vs. 7 discrimination via linear SVM, and 10-class
classification via CNN. For linear SVM,  = 0.12 and ρ = 2%. For the CNN,  = 0.25, ρ = 3%.
Linear SVM Four layer CNN
Semi-white box White box FGSM Semi-white box White box
No defense 0 0 19.45 8.87 8.87
Sparsifying front end 97.31 94.62 89.75 88.76 84.04
of the softmax layer, since its goal is simply to make yi > yt for some i 6= t. Thus, the adversary
can consider L− 1 binary classification problems, and solve for perturbations aiming to maximize
yi − yt for each i 6= t. We now apply the semi-white and white box attacks to each pair, with
weq = w
{i}
eq − w{t}eq being the equivalent locally linear model from the input to yi − yt. After
computing the distortions for each pair, the adversary applies its attack budget to the worst-case pair
for which the distortion is the largest: maxi,e yi(x+ e)− yt(x+ e) s.t. ‖e‖∞ ≤ .
FGSM attack: For binary classification, the standard FGSM attack (Goodfellow et al., 2015) can be
shown to be equivalent to the semi-white box attack using the locally linear model. However, it does
not have such a nice interpretation for more than two classes: it attacks along the gradient of the cost
function (typically cross-entropy), and hence does not take as direct an approach to confounding the
network as the semi-white box attack. As expected (and verified by experiments), it performs worse
(does less damage) than the semi-white box attack.
4 EXPERIMENTS
Setup: We consider two inference tasks on the MNIST dataset (LeCun et al., 1998): binary classifi-
cation of digit pairs via linear SVM, and multi-class classification via a four layer CNN. The CNN
consists of two convolutional layers (containing 20 and 40 feature maps, both with 5x5 local receptive
fields) and two fully connected layers (containing 1000 neurons each, with dropout) (Nielsen, 2015).
For the sparsifying front end, we use the Cohen-Debauchies-Feauveau 9/7 wavelet (Cohen et al.,
1992) and retrain the network with sparsified images for various values of ρ = K/N . We perturb
images with FGSM, semi-white box and white box attacks and report on classification accuracies.2
Results: For the binary classification task, we begin with the digits 3 and 7. Without the front end, an
attack3 with  = 0.12 completely overwhelms the classifier, reducing accuracy from 98.2% to 0%. We
find ρ = 2% to be the best choice for the 3 versus 7 scenario, and report on the accuracies obtained in
Table 1. Results for other digit pairs show a similar trend; insertion of the front end greatly improves
resilience to adversarial attacks. The optimal value of ρ lies between 1-5%, with ρ = 2% working
well for all scenarios.
For multi-class classification, the attacks use  = 0.25. We find that the locally linear attack is stronger
than FGSM; it degrades performance from 99.38% to 8.87% when no defense is present. Again, the
sparsifying front end (ρ = 3%) improves network robustness, increasing accuracy to 84.04% in the
worst-case scenario.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We have emphasized here the value of locally linear modeling for design of attacks and defenses,
and the connection between sparsity and robustness. We believe that these results just scratch the
surface, and hope that they stimulate the community towards developing a comprehensive design
framework, grounded in theoretical fundamentals, for robust neural networks. Important topics for
future work include developing better sparse generative models, as well as discriminative approaches
to sparsity (e.g., via sparsity of weights within the neural network). Promising results on the latter
approach have been omitted here due to lack of space.
2 Code is available at https://github.com/soorya19/sparsity-based-defenses.
3 The reported values of  are for images normalized to [0, 1].
3
Workshop track - ICLR 2018
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grants CNS-1518812 and
CCF-1755808, by Systems on Nanoscale Information fabriCs (SONIC), one of the six SRC STARnet
Centers, sponsored by MARCO and DARPA, and by the UC Office of the President under grant No.
LFR-18-548175.
REFERENCES
Arjun Nitin Bhagoji, Daniel Cullina, Chawin Sitawarin, and Prateek Mittal. Enhancing robustness of
machine learning systems via data transformations. arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.02654, 2017.
Albert Cohen, Ingrid Daubechies, and J-C Feauveau. Biorthogonal bases of compactly supported
wavelets. Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics, 45(5):485–560, 1992.
Nilaksh Das, Madhuri Shanbhogue, Shang-Tse Chen, Fred Hohman, Li Chen, Michael E Kounavis,
and Duen Horng Chau. Keeping the bad guys out: Protecting and vaccinating deep learning with
JPEG compression. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.02900, 2017.
Alhussein Fawzi, Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Pascal Frossard, and Stefano Soatto. Classifica-
tion regions of deep neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.09552, 2017.
Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversarial
examples. In International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2015.
Chuan Guo, Mayank Rana, Moustapha Cisse, and Laurens van der Maaten. Countering adversarial
images using input transformations. In International Conference on Learning Representations
(ICLR), 2018.
Andrew Ilyas, Ajil Jalal, Eirini Asteri, Constantinos Daskalakis, and Alexandros G Dimakis.
The robust manifold defense: Adversarial training using generative models. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1712.09196, 2017.
Yann LeCun, Le´on Bottou, Yoshua Bengio, and Patrick Haffner. Gradient-based learning applied to
document recognition. Proceedings of the IEEE, 86(11):2278–2324, 1998.
Zhinus Marzi, Soorya Gopalakrishnan, Upamanyu Madhow, and Ramtin Pedarsani. Sparsity-based
defense against adversarial attacks on linear classifiers. In IEEE International Symposium on
Information Theory (ISIT), 2018. To appear. (arXiv:1801.04695).
Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, and Pascal Frossard. DeepFool: A simple and
accurate method to fool deep neural networks. In IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition (CVPR), pp. 2574–2582, 2016.
Michael A Nielsen. Neural Networks and Deep Learning. Determination Press, 2015.
Ben Poole, Subhaneil Lahiri, Maithra Raghu, Jascha Sohl-Dickstein, and Surya Ganguli. Exponential
expressivity in deep neural networks through transient chaos. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems (NIPS), pp. 3360–3368, 2016.
Pouya Samangouei, Maya Kabkab, and Rama Chellappa. Defense-GAN: Protecting classifiers
against adversarial attacks using generative models. In International Conference on Learning
Representations (ICLR), 2018.
Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow,
and Rob Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. In International Conference on Learning
Representations (ICLR), 2014.
4
